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CARBON EMISSIONS, SAI, AND UNINTENDED HARMS: THREE RESPONSES 
 
Calculating the Incalculable: Is SAI the Lesser of Two Evils?* 
Mike Hulme 
 
The possibility of altering the world’s climate through intentional stratospheric aerosol injection 
(SAI)—or indeed through any other solar radiation management (SRM) technology—brings with 
it not just a new technology for humans to consider but a new category of problem. As authors 
such as Bron Szerszynski, Willis Jenkins, and Christopher J. Preston have pointed out, 
intervening deliberately in the skies would “begin the era of global artificing.”1 In his article 
“Carbon Emissions, Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, and Unintended Harms,” which explores 
the relative moral culpability of agents inducing climate harms through their actions, Preston 
applies the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to investigate one specific question: Does 
intentionality make an ethical difference when considering culpability for causing climate 
harms? He reaches the conclusion—surprising both to him and to me—that those who might 
deliberately engineer the world’s climate through SAI may be less culpable than those who 
continue to emit greenhouse gases (GHGs). In his application of the DDE, Preston offers four 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the doctrine to be able to shield an agent from 
some portion of culpability: (a) the intended final end must be good; (b) the intended means must 
be morally acceptable; (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed; and (d) the good end 
must be proportionate to the bad upshot (p. XXX). Preston argues that conditions (a), (c), and (d) 
are fulfilled by a hypothetical benevolent climate engineer, but concedes that some might argue 
                                                 
* This essay is in response to Christopher J. Preston’s “Carbon Emissions, Stratospheric Aerosol 
Injection, and Unintended Harms,” Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 4 (2017).  
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that condition (b) is not. This concession is a gesture to those commentators—such as Dale 
Jamieson and Clive Hamilton—who argue on moral grounds that intentional climate engineering 
is not something that humans should do because it is inherently wrong (a position that Preston 
himself on occasions seems to have argued).2 
Preston’s exploration of the application of the DDE as a partial ethical defense for SAI is 
provocative and useful, but it leads to a confusing and unpersuasive conclusion. My concerns are 
focused not on condition (b) but rather on conditions (a), (c), and (d).3 Specifically, there are 
three (related) aspects of his argument that leave me unconvinced: the implied symmetry 
between SAI and GHG-induced climate goods and harms, the (potential) knowability of the 
harms, and the surprising absence in his discussion of the political implications of SAI.  
 
ASYMMETRY 
 
I think Preston underplays the asymmetry between the public goods potentially provided by SAI 
and those provided by GHG emissions. The sole purpose behind GHG emissions is, and always 
has been, to provide cheap and reliable energy to enable the provision of welfare goods.4 There is 
no intention from the emitters of GHGs to cause harm, even though it has now emerged that their 
emissions have resulted in substantial harm. As Preston himself says, “anthropogenic climate 
change remains an accident of atmospheric chemistry” (p. XXX).  
The sole purpose of SAI, however, is to undo some of the unintended harms of GHG 
emissions. Yet the ethical cost of limiting some of these harms is inevitably to introduce other 
climate harms of an indeterminate nature. Unlike the purveyors of coal in nineteenth-century 
Britain, the putative SAI engineers have their eyes wide open. There is no other public good 
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delivered by SAI; it is merely in the business of harm limitation through trying to reverse 
engineer the climate system. I do not think it is therefore entirely fair to treat these two actions 
symmetrically as Preston does. The “good ends” of SAI and GHG are quite different, which 
makes them much harder to equate using a quantified cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of GHG 
emissions are expressed in terms of energy-related welfare goods, whereas the benefits of SAI 
are expressed as the negative costs of avoided climate harms.  
At the very least this asymmetry makes the type of cost-benefit calculation on which 
Preston’s argument relies considerably more challenging. It also lends weight to the “closeness” 
criticism of the DDE offered by Preston and originating from Philippa Foot.5 In the case of SAI, 
the benefits and costs are all related to future climate harms—the benefits being harms avoided, 
and the costs being new harms introduced. Preston’s case relies on being able to distinguish 
between these harms, a forensic task likely to be well beyond the capability of analysts. By 
contrast, in the case of GHG emissions the benefits are welfare goods generated through energy 
services—goods of a quite different nature from the harms introduced inadvertently by changing 
the climate.  
 
INDETERMINACY 
 
Central to Preston’s argument is the (assumed) knowability of the harms that result from SAI and 
from GHG and (importantly) the ability of some knowledgeable agent to be able to distinguish 
between them. However, Preston is guilty of circular reasoning here. He assumes that the climate 
engineer has “overwhelming evidence that the benefits of deployment will outweigh the harms” 
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(p. XXX), and he uses this very same assumption to satisfy criterion (d) in the DDE defense of 
SAI.  
In defense of his position, Preston argues that the harms of GHG emissions (by which he 
means some cost-benefit calculation of the consequences of using fossil fuels) are more certain 
than those of SAI. But there are three problems here. First, if we concede (correctly in my view) 
that the harms of SAI are poorly known (or at least less well-known than those resulting from 
GHGs),6 we cannot therefore safely assume that they are lesser than those resulting from GHGs. 
Calculating the harms of SAI requires knowing the original harms caused by GHGs (which are 
of course to be limited) and also the additional harms introduced by SAI, a double calculation of 
uncertain risks. 
Second, it is dubious whether the harms of GHG emissions are actually as well-known or 
calculable as Preston implies, let alone those of SAI. We know that GHG emissions cause 
changes in the climate, and that these changes have tangible and potentially harmful effects. 
Preston lists some of these qualitatively. But this is not the same as calculating future harms in 
quantified and hence comparative form. Preston seems supremely confident that climate harms 
can be established “satisfactorily” through “extensive modeling” (p. XXX), but as others have 
argued, efforts to determine an ethically credible and epistemically robust social cost of carbon 
are doomed to failure.7 Given that the resolution of this question is “the sine qua non of any 
credible argument for climate engineering” (p. XXX), it is not promising that Preston has to 
“assume that the climate engineer has overwhelming evidence” (p. XXX) that the benefits of 
SAI deployment outweigh the costs. 
The third problem with Preston’s position on harms concerns their distributional effects. 
The full import of the harms of SAI (or of GHG emissions) is not in their aggregate effect, 
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gauged against the global temperature index. While the justification of SAI is usually expressed 
in terms of containing the rise in global temperature, its effects on regional climate and weather 
patterns will be quite different. Deploying SAI to stabilize the global temperature or limit its 
warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is not simply a case of reverse engineering the climate system 
back to some prior predictable state. Regional climates and local weather respond in nonlinear 
ways to different external forces, such that “undoing” the harms caused by GHGs cannot be 
guaranteed just by resetting the global temperature. Rather, the climate harms from SAI will be a 
function of the timing, reliability, and geography of the SAI deployment, factors that will lead to 
very different regional climate responses.8 In other words, the harms of SAI are first and 
foremost to be determined distributionally and the uncertainties of these distributional effects 
(not least in relation to precipitation dynamics) are considerably greater than those associated 
with globally aggregated harms. It matters not just that there may only be a “small minority” of 
people adversely affected by SAI (p. XXX) or “some [undetermined] unlucky populations” (p. 
XXX), but crucially which minority and which populations become the unlucky victims.  
 
POLITICS 
 
Because the harms associated with SAI are first and foremost distributional in nature, the act of 
climate engineering through SAI carries huge political implications. Beyond agreeing with David 
Keith that SAI might “shake up the stale politics of climate change,” Preston—implying without 
further explanation that this would be a good thing—sidesteps the political problem of SAI by 
assuming that it would only be undertaken once a “broad consensus” has been reached about the 
“overall” favorable cost-benefit ratio of the climate effects of SAI (p. XXX). This again hints of 
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circular reasoning and avoids political realities. Again, the politics of SAI are not about an 
“overall” (globally aggregated) comparison of harms, but very specifically about how these 
respective harms are regionally differentiated and credibly attributed to different types of actions. 
This might very well shake up the politics, but in a deeply unconstructive manner. Preston talks 
about the need to reduce the social and ethical doubts of climate engineering through SAI, but 
makes no mention of the need to reduce the political ramifications.  
My point here is that in establishing the harms of SAI one should not simply be weighing 
the relevant climate-induced harms (aggregated or distributed) against those resulting from GHG 
emissions. Rather, one should also consider the additional “political harms” that would flow 
from any implementation of an SAI climate engineering strategy. I have explored some of these 
harms elsewhere,9 and they are considerable, as they layer further political complexity over the 
already troubled politics and justice implications of negotiating conventional GHG mitigation. 
For example, SAI opens up the possibility of new interstate actions under international law for 
harms caused, and also introduces the possibilities of nonstate SAI engineers operating beyond 
national or international jurisdictions. The force of Preston’s overall argument, which challenges 
one of the ethical reasons not to engineer the climate through SAI, seems considerably weakened 
by not including any of these political considerations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Preston is correct to suggest that his argument is unwelcome for “people who view climate 
engineering as unacceptable from any angle” (p. XXX). Although not arguing against SAI on 
moral or ontological grounds, I have argued against it using epistemic, environmental, and 
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political criteria.10 And although Preston concludes that GHG mitigation remains the ultimate 
moral priority, paradoxically he has developed an argument which, he claims, diffuses one 
ethical objection for those who are seeking to promote SAI as a viable climate management 
strategy. Preston’s ethical pass for SAI engineers is not well-grounded for the reasons explained 
above: centrally, that his argument is based on the utilitarian paradigm of comparative cost-
benefit analysis, which I do not believe can offer the sure foundation for ethical reasoning he 
seems to suggest it does.  
Preston’s argument could be read as suggesting that “two wrongs make a right” or that 
SAI is the “lesser of two evils.” Yet even if one buys into Preston’s use of DDE to defend such 
reasoning, SAI might still be sensibly resisted as being unfeasible, unjust, or simply unwise. 
 
NOTES 
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Abstract: Christopher J. Preston’s use of the doctrine of double effect to claim that hypothetical 
climate engineers might very well be less culpable for climate harms than those who continue to 
emit greenhouse gases is unpersuasive. His argument rests shakily on the ability to determine 
and quantify climate harms and to distinguish forensically between their causes. He is also 
largely silent about the distributional effects of these harms and their ethical and political 
ramifications. 
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